Distribution of the benefits of regulation vs. competition: The case of mobile telephony in South Africa
Ryan Hawthorne and
Lukasz Grzybowski
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 74, issue C
Abstract:
We test for the distributional effects of regulation and entry in the mobile telecommunications sector in a highly unequal country, South Africa. Using six waves of a consumer survey of over 134,000 individuals between 2009–2014, we estimate a discrete choice model allowing for individual-specific price-responsiveness and preferences for network operators. Next, we use a demand and supply equilibrium framework to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare without entry and mobile termination rate regulation. We find that, in the South African context, regulation benefits consumers significantly more than entry does, and that high-income consumers and city-dwellers benefit more in terms of increased consumer surplus.
Keywords: Mobile telecommunications; Regulation; Entry; Termination rates; Discrete choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L50 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Working Paper: Distribution of the benefits of regulation vs. competition: The case of mobile telephony in South Africa (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:74:y:2021:i:c:s0167718720300965
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102673
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