Cross-Licensing and competition

Doh-Shin Jeon and Yassine Lefouili

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Abstract: We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.

Keywords: Cross-Licensing; Royalties; Collusion; Antitrust and Intellectual Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-24
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03263659v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2018, 49 (3), pp.656-671. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12248⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross‐licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2017)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03263659

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12248

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