Cross-Licensing and Competition

Doh-Shin Jeon and Yassine Lefouili ()
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Yassine Lefouili: Toulouse School of Economics

No 13-11, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N(> 2) firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase. It is shown that the most collusive cross-licensing royalty, i.e. the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit, is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements. When the terms of the agreements are not observable to third parties, the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty. However, when the terms of the agreements are public, the most competitive royalty (i.e. zero) can also be bilaterally efficient. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived from these results.

Keywords: Cross-Licensing; Collusion; Antitrust and Intellectual Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L44 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross‐licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2017)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:1311

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