Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty

Emeric Henry

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver, I study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information. Research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting. I show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver: he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium, discloses all the information he obtained. However this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing. Finally I identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive.

Date: 2009-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

Published in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 2009, 119 (539), pp.1036 - 1064

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty (2009)
Journal Article: Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03417703

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().