Sanctions that signal: An experiment

Roberto Galbiati, Karl Schlag and Joël van Der Weele

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.

Keywords: Sanctions; Beliefs; Expressive law; Deterrence; Coordination; Minimum-effort-game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461037v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2013, 94, pp.34 - 51. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461037v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sanctions that signal: An experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Sanctions that signal: An experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03461037

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().