Managing competition on a two-sided platform

Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz

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Abstract: On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; intermediation; network effects; platform competition; pricing; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2019, 28 (1), pp.5-22. ⟨10.1111/jems.12311⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Managing competition on a two‐sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing competition on a two-sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03590196

DOI: 10.1111/jems.12311

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