Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform

Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.

Keywords: network effects; two-sided markets; platform competition; intermediation; pricing; imperfect competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01833106
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01833106/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Managing competition on a two‐sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing competition on a two-sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing competition on a two-sided platform (2019)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
Working Paper: Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01833106

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().