A Note on the Optimality of Domain-Specific Liability

Eric Langlais, Tim Friehe and Elisabeth Schulte

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Abstract: This paper analyses the socially optimal sharing of liability when both consumers and the environment incur harm from the activity of a monopolistic firm. We show that the optimal allocation depends on the domain-specific harm (consumers vs environment) as well as on the specific relationship between harm and output (proportional vs cumulative).

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Date: 2022
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Published in Review of Law and Economics, 2022

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03640759

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