Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning and Martin Lindeboom

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Abstract: We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic "Gatekeeper Protocol" increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals' ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.

Keywords: Disability Insurance; Screening; Applications; Awards; Targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Human Resources, 2022, 57 (3), ⟨10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2024)
Working Paper: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2020)
Working Paper: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03689792

DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1

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