Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning and Maarten Lindeboom

Journal of Human Resources, 2024, vol. 59, issue 5, 1353-1386

Abstract: We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch disability insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “gatekeeper protocol†increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40 percent in one year) following the reform, particularly among those with difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals who were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by self-screening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.

JEL-codes: H2 I3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
Note: DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2022)
Working Paper: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2020)
Working Paper: Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:59:y:2024:i:5:p:1353-1386

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