ON THE STRONG HYBRID SOLUTION OF AN N-PERSON GAME

Bertrand Crettez (), Rabia Nessah () and Tarik Tazdaït
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Bertrand Crettez: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Rabia Nessah: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. In the strong hybrid solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, the strategy profile assigned to each coalition is strongly Pareto optimal. We show that there exists a strong hybrid solution whenever preferences are partially quasi-transferable.

Keywords: hybrid solution; strong hybrid solution; N -Person Game coalition structure hybrid solution strong hybrid solution; N -Person Game; coalition structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03875293v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, 117, pp.61-68. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.006⟩

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Journal Article: On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03875293

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.006

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