ON THE STRONG β-HYBRID SOLUTION OF AN N-PERSON GAME

Bertrand Crettez (), Rabia Nessah () and Tarik Tazdaït ()
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Rabia Nessah: IESEG - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, LEM - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Management - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Tarik Tazdaït: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - Université Paris-Saclay - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales

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Abstract: We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibria, the strong β-hybrid solution, which is a refinement of the hybrid solution introduced by Zhao. Zhao's solution is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. This paper's solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, assigns to each coalition a strategy profile that is strongly Pareto optimal. Moreover, like the β-core, deviations by subcoalitions of any existing coalition are deterred by the threat of a unique counter-strategy available to the non-deviating players. Zhao proved the existence of existence of strong β-hybrid solution for transferable utility games with compact and convex strategy spaces and concave continuous payoff functions. Here, we extend his result to non-transferable utility games.

Keywords: α-core β-core N -person game coalition structure hybrid solution strong hybrid solution; α-core; β-core; N -person game; coalition structure; hybrid solution; strong hybrid solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04204632v1
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2023, 94 (3), pp.363-377. ⟨10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04204632

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0

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