The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives

Maurice Salles

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Abstract: Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.

Date: 2022
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z⟩

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Journal Article: The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03886194

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z

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