The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives

Maurice Salles

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 60, issue 1, No 15, 299-311

Abstract: Abstract Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.

Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01437-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().