Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization

Thomas Dallery

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Abstract: Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders' interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability.JEL classification: D21, E12, G30

Date: 2009-10-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Review of Radical Political Economics, 2009, Review of Radical Political Economics, 41 (4), pp.492-515. ⟨10.1177/0486613409341371⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04160719

DOI: 10.1177/0486613409341371

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