Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization

Thomas Dallery

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2009, vol. 41, issue 4, 492-515

Abstract: Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders’ interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability. JEL classification: D21, E12, G30

Keywords: financialization; theory of the firm; post-Keynesian economics; investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization (2009)
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