The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum
Ion Pohoață,
Delia-Elena Diaconașu () and
Ioana Negru
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Ion Pohoață: UAIC - Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași = Universitatea Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iași
Delia-Elena Diaconașu: UAIC - Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași = Universitatea Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iași
Ioana Negru: ULBS - "Lucian Blaga" University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Delia Elena Diaconaşu
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Abstract:
This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon' does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.
Keywords: inflation; conservative banker; Principal-Agent contract; financial autonomy; budgetary financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-hme and nep-mon
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04183244v2
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Published in Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2024, Volume XVII, ⟨10.46298/jpe.12256⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04183244
DOI: 10.46298/jpe.12256
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