Motivated Information Acquisition and Social Norm Formation

Eugen Dimant (), Fabio Galeotti () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Marie Claire Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We examine the effect of self-selected peer information on individual behavior and social norm formation via two experiments (N=1,945; N=2,414) using a lying game and political identification. A self-serving bias emerges in endogenous information search, wherein lenient sources (i.e., sources containing more tolerant empirical or normative information regarding dishonesty), especially those aligned with political identification, are preferred. Selecting lenient sources about peer perception of social norms boosts dishonesty, while peer behavior information chiefly influences expectations about dishonesty, with a minor impact on own behavior. Importantly, peer approval expectations stay largely unaltered by both information types. In a follow-up experiment with exogenously assigned sources, the influence of social information on behavior and expectations is diminished.

Keywords: Social Norms; Information Acquisition; Peer Effects; Group Identity; Dishonesty; Experiment Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04199140v2
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Published in European Economic Review, 2024, 167, pp.104778. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104778⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04199140

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104778

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