Founder involvement in CEO turnover

Oskar Kowalewski (), Aleksandra Majda-Kariozen and Błażej Socha
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Aleksandra Majda-Kariozen: Faculty of Management, University of Lodz
Błażej Socha: Faculty of Management, University of Lodz

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Abstract: Abstract We study the role of a company founder in the internal governance of firms. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000–2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor‐performing founder‐CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover, having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreases the likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor‐performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.

Date: 2023-07
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Published in Strategic Change, 2023, 32 (4-5), pp.111-123. ⟨10.1002/jsc.2547⟩

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Working Paper: Founder Involvement in CEO Turnover (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04273953

DOI: 10.1002/jsc.2547

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