Founder Involvement in CEO Turnover
Oskar Kowalewski (),
Aleksandra Majda-Kariozen () and
Blazej Socha ()
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Aleksandra Majda-Kariozen: Faculty of Management, University of Lodz
Blazej Socha: Faculty of Management, University of Lodz
No 2019-ACF-01, Working Papers from IESEG School of Management
We study the role of a company founder in its internal governance. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000–2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor-performing founder-CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover,having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreasesthe likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly,founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor-performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.
Keywords: Founder involvement; CEO turnover; Corporate governance; Firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ies:wpaper:f201807
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