 Fraud diffusion in firms: the case of tacit collusionPhilippe Jacquinot and
Arnaud Pellissier-Tanon
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: When it comes to fraud, the literature is mainly concerned with manoeuvres that are illegal in the eyes of management or the legislator. It pays little attention to the climate of fraud that may prevail in a company and lead managers and employees to consider certain manoeuvres as normal. We are interested in cases where employees start to commit fraud in imitation of the manager, even though the manager had not asked them to do so. We refer to this as tacit collusion fraud. Over and above the questions of incentive and control that this scenario raises, we are interested in the process by which the fraud appears, spreads and eventually comes to an end. We formulate the hypothesis that this process is based on two effects, one, individual, of addiction, the other, collective, of contagion, which in themselves find their own limit. We compare this model with the case of a Société d'Economie Mixte d'Aménagement Foncier and highlight the importance of the personal integrity of managers and corporate officers. Keywords: Fraud; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in 10th IFSAM World Conference, International Federation of Scholarly Associations of Management (IFSAM), Jul 2010, Paris, France There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04275298 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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