Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang (jerome.lang@irit.fr), Ali Ozkes and Stéphane Airiau (stephane.airiau@dauphine.fr)
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Umberto Grandi: IRIT - Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - UT - Université de Toulouse - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT - Université de Toulouse
Jérôme Lang: LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Stéphane Airiau: LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters' preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter's preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

Date: 2022-12-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04305671v2
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda (2024)
Working Paper: Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda (2020)
Working Paper: Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04305671

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0

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