Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Umberto Grandi (), Jérôme Lang (), Ali Ozkes and Stéphane Airiau ()
Additional contact information
Umberto Grandi: Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Jérôme Lang: CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL
Stéphane Airiau: LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL

Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 63, issue 3, No 9, 675 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda (2022)
Working Paper: Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:63:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01436-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().