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Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions

Boris van Leeuwen and Ingela Alger ()
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Boris van Leeuwen: Tilburg University [Tilburg] - Netspar
Ingela Alger: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

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Abstract: Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We structurally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. Finite mixture analyses show that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two or three types: all display a Kantian moral concern, which they combine with aheadness aversion, behindness aversion, or both. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes (distributional preferences as well as reciprocity) is also evaluated.

Date: 2024-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04840937v1
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Published in Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2024, 2 (4), pp.665-706. ⟨10.1086/732125⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04840937

DOI: 10.1086/732125

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