Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions

Ingela Alger and Boris van Leeuwen ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jörgen W. Weibull

No 19-100, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary founda- tions. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We struc- turally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. Finite mixture analyses show that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two or three types: all display a Kantian moral concern, which they combine with aheadness aversion, behindness aver- sion, or both. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes (distributional preferences as well as reciprocity) is also evaluated.

JEL-codes: C49 C72 C9 C91 D03 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11, Revised 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:iastwp:123761

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