Colluding against Environmental Regulation

Jorge Ale-Chilet, Cuicui Chen, Jing Li and Mathias Reynaert
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Jorge Ale-Chilet: UANDES - Universidad de los Andes [Santiago]
Cuicui Chen: SUNY - State University of New York
Jing Li: Tufts University [Medford]

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Abstract: We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by €1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.

Keywords: noncompliance; automobile market; pollution; regulation; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05492381v1
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Published in Review of Economic Studies, 2026, 93 (1), pp.35-71. ⟨10.1093/restud/rdaf024⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Colluding Against Environmental Regulation (2021)
Working Paper: Colluding Against Environmental Regulation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05492381

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf024

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