Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems

Jean-Christophe Pereau and Tarik Tazdaït

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.

Keywords: precautionary commitment; global environmental problems; coalition; unilateral commitment; precautionary commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00009889v1
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Published in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2001, 20 (3), pp.225-239. ⟨10.1023/A:1012638802001⟩

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Journal Article: Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009889

DOI: 10.1023/A:1012638802001

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