Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems

Jean-Christophe Pereau and Tarik Tazdaït

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2001, vol. 20, issue 3, 225-239

Abstract: This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. We call this behaviour precautionary commitment. Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue.We also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinatedglobal co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Keywords: global environmental problems; coalition; unilateral commitment; nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1012638802001

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