Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais

Laurent Soulat

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the mechanisms of collective control, such as in Japanese keiretsu, that are characterized by firms groupings, decentralized decision-makings and cross-shareholdings. We develop a model about these mechanisms based on initial incentive contracts offered by shareholders to the manager, with an asymmetric information and with a possibility of compensation payments. These mechanisms of control are compared to reputation control, the latter working on original discount process. The results are obtained with simulations. The efficiency of the collective control depends on the levels of discount coefficient and on the differences in effort costs and expected profits. The collective control tends to dominate for a larger number of environment states for which reputation is inefficient to maintain discipline over the manager only. On the other hand, the reputation appears to be especially for high discounting coefficients, low learning costs or periods, and for high values of accumulated reputation.

Keywords: corporate governance; Incentive theory; Japanese keiretsu; reputation and control mechanisms; keiretsu financier; réputation et mécanismes de contrôle; gouvernement d'entreprises; Théorie des incitations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00194892
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Published in 2005

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais (2005)
Working Paper: Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00194892

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