Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais

Laurent Soulat

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper focuses on the mechanisms of collective control, such as in Japanese keiretsu, that is characterized by firms’ groupings, decentralized decision-makings and cross-shareholdings. We develop a model about these mechanisms based on initial incentive contracts offered by shareholders to the manager, with an asymmetric information and with a possibility of compensation payments. These mechanisms of control are compared to reputation control, the latter working on original discount process. The results are obtained with simulations. The efficiency of the collective control depends on the levels of discount coefficient and on the differences in effort costs and expected profits. The collective control tends to dominate for a larger number of environment states for which reputation is inefficient to maintain discipline over the manager only. On the other hand, the reputation appears to be especially for high discounting coefficients, low learning costs or periods, and for high values of accumulated reputation

Keywords: Incentive theory; corporate governance; reputation and control mechanisms; Japanese keiretsu (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G32 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
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Related works:
Working Paper: Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais (2005)
Working Paper: Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation: une application au keiretsu financier japonais (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla05046

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