EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

Bernard Fortin (), Guy Lacroix () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account endogenous interactions, i.e., social conformity effects, exogenous interactions, i.e., fairness effects, and correlated effects. Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, and given a feedback on theother members' reporting behavior. Myopic and self-consistent expectations are considered in the analysis. In the latter case, the estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses helps identify the model. Our results provide evidence of fairness effects but reject social conformity.

Keywords: laboratory experiments; simultaneous Tobit; social interactions; tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00238448
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (140) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 91 (11-12), pp. 2089-2112

Downloads: (external link)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00238448/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax evasion and social interactions (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00238448

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-12
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00238448