Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures

Benoît Le Maux, Yvon Rocaboy and Timothy Goodspeed ()

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Abstract: In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions. The model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power. We estimate the model in the case of the French départements. Our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the French départements depend on the effective political power of the majority.

Keywords: Political fragmentation; Local public services; Party ideology; Herfindahl-Hirschman index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in Public Choice, 2011, 147 (1-2), pp.43-67. ⟨10.1007/s11127-010-9603-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures (2011)
Working Paper: Political fragmentation, Party ideology and Public expenditures (2011)
Working Paper: Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00453174

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9603-z

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