Political fragmentation, Party ideology and Public expenditures

Timothy Goodspeed (tgoodspe@hunter.cuny.edu), Yvon Rocaboy and Benoît Le Maux

No 435, Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College from Hunter College Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions. The model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power. We estimate the model in the case of the French départements. Our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the French départements depend on the effective political power of the majority.

Keywords: Political fragmentation; Local public services; Partisan government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 D70 H40 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures (2011)
Working Paper: Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures (2011)
Working Paper: Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:htr:hcecon:435

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