Bargaining over Public Goods

Julio Dávila, Jan Eeckhout and Cesar Martinelli

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Abstract: In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bar- gaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lin- dahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The pro- cedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.

Keywords: public goods; alternating offers bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00633592v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11 (6), pp.927-945. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00633592

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x

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