Bargaining over Public Goods

Julio Dávila, Jan Eeckhout and Cesar Martinelli

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 11, issue 6, 927-945

Abstract: In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price‐taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining Over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
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