Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market

Michel Mougeot, Benjamin Pelloux, Jean-Louis Rullière () and Florence Naegelen
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Benjamin Pelloux: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Auctions; Speculation; CO2 Emission Permit Market; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011, 13 (5), pp. 829-856

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Journal Article: Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00642537

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