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Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays

Nicolas Chatelais

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Abstract: n this paper, we try to understand the economic policies choice of countries in terms of size. According to the case whether a country is large or small, it will have different incentives in the choice of its growth strategy. Theoretically, a large country would prefer use a policy which stimulate its domestic demand while a small country will choose a strategy improving its competitiveness and its attractiveness, because net exports contribute significantly to economic growth. In a monetary union framework, like the euro area, these choices are critical. Thus we highlight the European construction, in particular the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an asymmetric process promoting both small countries and the implementation of non-cooperative growth policies. Among them, we are particularly interested in the introduction of a tax competition as a growth policy in some countries. This policy should be regarded as an opportunist strategy of small countries harmful to the overall growth of the EU.

Keywords: Country size; free-riding; non-cooperative behaviors; European Union; Tax competition; small countries.; stratégie opportuniste; Taille de pays; concurrence fiscale; comportement non coopératif; stratégie opportuniste. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00654388
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Published in 2011

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Working Paper: Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays (2011) Downloads
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