Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays

Nicolas Chatelais

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this paper, we try to understand the economic policies choice of countries in terms of size. According to the case whether a country is large or small, it will have different incentives in the choice of its growth strategy. Theoretically, a large country would prefer use a policy which stimulate its domestic demand while a small country will choose a strategy improving its competitiveness and its attractiveness, because net exports contribute significantly to economic growth. In a monetary union framework, like the euro area, these choices are critical. Thus we highlight the European construction, in particular the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an asymmetric process promoting both small countries and the implementation of non-cooperative growth policies. Among them, we are particularly interested in the introduction of a tax competition as a growth policy in some countries. This policy should be regarded as an opportunist strategy of small countries harmful to the overall growth of the EU

Keywords: Country size; free-riding; non-cooperative behaviors; European Union; small countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 E62 F2 H30 H32 H73 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11082.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays (2011)
Working Paper: Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11082

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