Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

Magnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota-Graziosi ()
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Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

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Abstract: We examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two-player contest. The timing of moves, determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following: (1) Players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game. (2) The SPE does not need to be unique, in particular, there is no unique SPE with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero. (3) Symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the Cournot-Nash level. (4) Finally, there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework; a finding most central in the analysis of fixedprize contests.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; Contests; Endogenous prize; Endogenous timing; Cournot-Nash game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 75 (1), pp.168-184. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models (2012)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models (2011)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models (2011)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent?Seeking and Conflict Models (2010)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00689738

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001

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