Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi () and Magnus Hoffmann
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Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Magnus Hoffmann: Department of Economics - Department of Economics - OVGU - Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg = Otto-von-Guericke University [Magdeburg]
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

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Abstract: This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre‐play stage prior to the contest‐subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following. (1) Players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game, (2) the SPE does not need to be unique, (3) in particular, there is no unique SPE with sequential moves if costs of effort are exclusively endogenously determined, (4) if the unique SPE is sequential play, the win probability in the NE is in no way crucial for the determination of an endogenous leadership, (5) and symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the Nash‐Cournot level

Keywords: Contests; Endogenous timing; Endogenous prize (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00553119
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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models (2012)
Working Paper: Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models (2012)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent?Seeking and Conflict Models (2010)
Working Paper: Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models (2010)
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