How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Philippe Jehiel () and Jacques Thisse

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Abstract: This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.

Keywords: States; Confederation; Auction; Spillovers; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89 (7), pp.1191-1210. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: How to win a decision in a confederation (2005)
Working Paper: How to win a decision in a confederation (2005)
Working Paper: How to Win a Decision in a Confederation (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754075

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001

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