How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jacques Thisse and Philippe Jehiel ()

No 3465, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off: competition among jurisdictions yields higher transfers to the government, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when jurisdictions negotiate prior to the decision-making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous jurisdictions.

Keywords: Jurisdictions; Confederation; Auction; Spillovers; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 H41 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3465 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to win a decision in a confederation (2005)
Working Paper: How to win a decision in a confederation (2005)
Working Paper: How to Win a Decision in a Confederation (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3465

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3465

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().