p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Olivier Tercieux

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Abstract: In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information.

Keywords: Set-valued concepts; Incomplete information; Refinements; Robustness; p-dominance; Risk-dominance; Higher order uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 56 (2), pp.371-384. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004⟩

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Journal Article: p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754138

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004

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