p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Olivier Tercieux

Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, vol. 56, issue 2, 371-384

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information (2006)
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