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An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Keywords: Core; TU-Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Fourth International workshop " Models of Influence and Network Theory (MINT) ", Apr 2013, Amsterdam, Netherlands

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Working Paper: An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (2013)
Working Paper: An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games (2012)
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