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Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?

Haoran He () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

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Abstract: We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

Keywords: preference aggregation; inequity aversion; Team; experiment; social image (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-ltv, nep-soc and nep-upt
Date: 2017
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00996545v4
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2017, pp. 111-124

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