Axioms of Invariance for TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: We introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with a fixed but arbitrary player set. These axioms require either invariance of an allocation rule or invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a specified player in two related TU-games. Combinations of these new axioms are used to characterize the Shapley value, the Equal Division rule, and the Equal Surplus Division rule. The classical axioms of Efficiency, Anonymity, Equal treatment of equals, Additivity and Linearity are not used.

Keywords: Game; Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (4), pp.891-902. ⟨10.1007/s00182-014-0458-2⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Axioms of invariance for TU-games (2015)
Working Paper: Axioms of Invariance for TU-games (2012)
Working Paper: Axioms of invariance for TU-games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01096552

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0458-2

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