Axioms of invariance for TU-games
Sylvain Béal (),
Eric Rémila and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with a fixed but arbitrary player set, which require either invariance of an allocation rule or invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a specified subset of players in two related TU-games. Comparisons with other axioms are provided. These new axioms are used to characterize the Shapley value, the equal division rule, the equal surplus division rule and the Banzhaf value. The classical axioms of efficiency, anonymity, symmetry and additivity are not used.
Keywords: uniform addition invariance; uniform transfer invariance; Shapley value; equal division rule; equal surplus division rule; Banzhaf value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Axioms of invariance for TU-games (2015)
Working Paper: Axioms of Invariance for TU-games (2015)
Working Paper: Axioms of Invariance for TU-games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:41530
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