Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining

Ahmet Ozkardas () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Ahmet Ozkardas: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Turgut Ozal University

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Abstract: We investigate a wage bargaining between the union and the firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruuistic where a hostile union is on go-slow in every disagreement period and an altruistic union never threatens the firm and holds out in every disagreement period. Then we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining when the union's attitude is determined exogenously. Furthermore, we determine necessary conditions for the extreme equilibrium payoffs of both parties independently of the union's attitude and calculate the extreme payoffs for a particular case of discount rates.

Keywords: varying discount rates; holdout threats; union - firm bargaining; subgame perfect equilibrium; go-slow threats; négociation entre un syndicat et une firme; taux d'escompte variable; équilibre en sous-jeu parfait; menaces de « go-slow » (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01112402v1
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Published in 2014

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Related works:
Working Paper: Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining (2014)
Working Paper: Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01112402

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