Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining
Ahmet Ozkardas () and
Agnieszka Rusinowska
Additional contact information
Ahmet Ozkardas: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Abstract:
We investigate a wage bargaining between the union and the firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruuistic where a hostile union is on go-slow in every disagreement period and an altruistic union never threatens the firm and holds out in every disagreement period. Then we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining when the union's attitude is determined exogenously. Furthermore, we determine necessary conditions for the extreme equilibrium payoffs of both parties independently of the union's attitude and calculate the extreme payoffs for a particular case of discount rates
Keywords: Union; firm bargaining; varying discount rates; holdout threats; go-slow threats; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2014/14072.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining (2014) 
Working Paper: Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14072
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().